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The past decade has witnessed two distinct yet interconnected 
developments in the understanding, policy and practice of corruption 
studies. On the one hand, corruption has progressively been constructed 
as a major threat to economic and social development through the use of 
deceivingly simplistic Western-centric definitions,1 awareness campaigns 
and international perception-indexes that create the illusion of measuring 
real levels of corruption.2 Such developments have recently been criticized 
by academic observers3 and activists alike for presenting corruption as 
a country-specific issue, closely linked to the public sector. On the other 
hand, and perhaps counterintuitively, anti-corruption efforts have been 
decontextualized, focusing on generic fixes that typically involve the 
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1  For more detail regarding the assumption of public-private divide, see Alena 
Ledeneva, ‘A Critique of the Global Corruption “Paradigm”’, in Jan Kubik and Amy Linch 
(eds), Postcommunism from Within: Social Justice, Mobilization and Hegemony, New York 
and London, 2013, pp. 297–332.
2  Frederik Galtung, ‘Criteria for Sustainable Corruption Control’, The European 
Journal of Development Research, 10, 1998, 1, pp. 105–28.
3  Ledeneva, ‘A Critique of the Global Corruption “Paradigm”’.
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public sector. This one-size-fits-all approach4 has not produced impressive 
results,5 and has come under attack for ignoring the historical context and 
function of contemporary states.6
 This article examines the construction and development of corruption 
concerns and anti-corruption practices from a comparative perspective in 
Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. It poses the question: how do corruption 
perceptions, policies and assumptions shape anti-corruption practices? 
Instead of looking at anti-corruption as an analytical category, this article 
takes the term back to its empirical dimension by contextually examining 
the emergence, role and practices of anti-corruption from a comparative 
perspective. Concretely, it focuses on the ways in which corruption 
in general and ‘grand corruption’ in particular are conceptualized, 
institutionalized and tackled. For the purposes of this article, grand 
corruption is loosely defined as corruption occurring within the highest 
echelons of power and presenting serious social, political and economic 
risks. Based on interviews with anti-corruption experts and practitioners 
from the three countries under discussion and analysis of relevant policy 
documents and official reports, the article critically examines the role of 
anti-corruption practices in the production of the contemporary political 
ethos. The research is based on mixed methods7 that combine qualitative 
and quantitative approaches, direct interaction with research subjects and 
documentary analysis. By combining multiple methods and empirical 
routes, the researchers have increased the validity of their findings and 
avoided the intrinsic weaknesses associated with individual methods or 
research based on single case-studies.
 The article proceeds as follows: the first part describes the context 
of the research with particular reference to (anti)corruption measures. 
The second part sets out an analytical framework based on a social 
constructionist approach.8 The following sections explain step-by-step 
4  Bo Rothstein, ‘Anti-Corruption: The Indirect “Big Bang” Approach’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 18, 2011, 2, pp. 228–50.
5  Despite massive investments in anti-corruption over the past ten years, there is not a 
single case of corruption having been tackled successfully in Europe. See the case of anti-
corruption in Georgia in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), The Anticorruption Frontline, The 
ANTICORRP Project, vol. 2, Oplanden, Berlin, Toronto, 2014.
6  See Heywood in this volume.
7  In total, 27 semi-structured interviews were conducted between November 2014 
and February 2016 with members of the judiciary (judges and prosecutors), high-ranking 
administrative officials, experts and journalists. The interviews were conducted in the 
original languages by the authors, who are native speakers. They lasted between 40 
minutes and two hours.
8  Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, London, 1966.
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the evolution, institutionalization, implementation and politicization of 
anti-corruption in the three countries under examination. In the final 
section, the three cases are discussed comparatively and wider theoretical 
implications are drawn.
Why compare Bulgaria, Greece and Romania?
The three cases discussed here are particularly suited for comparison 
because they are sufficiently similar to permit the emergence of meaningful 
conclusions, even though the case-study methodology developed in 
this article is not based on a systematic endeavour. The dimensions of 
comparison that will be used to highlight differences in outcomes are: 
perceptions of corruption; local governments’ relations with transnational 
organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF); electoral cycles; government stability; the existence 
of social or economic crises; entrepreneurial culture; and, in the case of 
Bulgaria and Romania, the historical Communist background. These 
analytical dimensions will shed light on key patterns of similarity and 
difference among the three countries. It is important to note that the 
three countries are different, most notably in that Greece has undergone 
neither a transition from Communism to capitalism nor a process of EU 
accession similar to Romania and Bulgaria. At the same time, the three 
countries also show strong similarities: high levels of perceived corruption 
coupled with strong distrust in government, parliament and political 
parties; harsh economic environments especially following the global 
financial crisis of 2008; and pressure from the international community 
to adapt their policies to the required standards (through successive 
Economic Adjustment Programmes in the case of Greece, and through 
the Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification [MCV] in the cases of 
Bulgaria and Romania). These similarities justify the comparative effort 
undertaken in this article which aims on the one hand to develop a 
research methodology for more systematic comparison and on the other 
to unravel the logic behind tackling corruption in a different manner at 
national level.
 There is wide international consensus regarding the prevalence of 
corruption and the need for tough anti-corruption policies in all three 
countries. In 2014, for example, the World Bank (WB) assigned some of the 
lowest scores in the EU regarding control of corruption to Bulgaria (-0.28), 
Greece (-0.2) and Romania (-0.14).9 International observers also agree 
9  The index ranges from (-2.5) to (2.5). More details regarding this index at <http://info.
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that corruption among high-ranking officials remains a pressing issue in 
Bulgaria,10 Greece11 and Romania.12 These countries have become what 
Leslie Holmes has called ‘rotten states’,13 being perceived not only as highly 
corrupt, but also as a threat to other EU member-states (given that they 
might, in the case of Greece, put additional pressure on the EU’s already 
strained budget or, in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, influence the 
culture of entrepreneurship and/or restrict access to the market for other 
European partners).14
 Such perceptions of corruption were shaped by the contact between 
national governments and transnational institutions such as the EU and 
IMF in the context of major financial crises and geopolitical shifts such 
as EU-enlargement. The global financial crisis of 2008 hit Bulgaria and 
Romania hard, while Greece came close to the brink of sovereign default 
and has yet to fully recover.15 The causes and evolution of the crisis were 
often mixed with a narrative of blame that traced the roots of the problems 
to the alleged graft and greed of local elites who had prioritized personal 
enrichment to the detriment of public well-being. These narratives of 
blame were strongly supported by the international community — in the 
case of Greece the troika of the European Commission (EC), European 
Central Bank (ECB) and IMF and, in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, 
the MCV instituted by the EC. These powerful entities, which acted as 
both international donors and gatekeepers to foreign funding, legitimized 
popular dissatisfaction with local elites and framed the solution within 
narratives of anti-corruption and the politics of austerity, putting financial 
worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.
10  European Commission, Annex Bulgaria to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, Brussels, 
3 February 2014 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-
crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_
bulgaria_chapter_en.pdf> [accessed 28 September 2015]. 
11  Council of Europe, Third Evaluation Round, Evaluation Report on Greece, Greco Eval 
III Rep 2009 (9E), Theme I, Strasbourg, 11 June 2010 (hereafter, Council of Europe 2010).
12  European Commission, Annex Romania to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, Brussels, 
3 February 2014 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-
crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_romania_
chapter_en.pdf> [accessed 28 November 2015] (hereafter, European Commission 2014b).
13  Leslie Holmes, Rotten States? Corruption, Post-Communism and Neoliberalism, 
Durham, NC, 2006.
14  It is of course debatable to what extent the labels correspond to reality and how 
much they shape new perceptions, thereby impacting on real life through self-fulfilling 
prophecies.
15  European Commission, ‘Financial Assistance to Greece’, 11 July 2016 <http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm> 
[accessed 17 August 2016].
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and political pressure on the three countries to ‘solve their corruption 
issue’.16
 Working in crisis mode is certainly familiar to locals, as contemporary 
international pressure is juxtaposed against a recent history marked by 
abrupt change and social cacophony (in Greece, the 2008 financial crisis 
led to street protests and changes in government, while in Bulgaria and 
Romania the transition from Communism to capitalism was a traumatic 
process whose social effects are yet to be fully evaluated). Domestic factors 
such as electoral cycles, government stability and shifts in local elites 
have had a strong impact, shaping the perception of corruption and the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies at local level.
 Frequent elections have been particularly important for this research 
because they have put the issue of corruption on the public agenda. 
Romania is the exception, but parliaments in Bulgaria and Greece have 
rarely served their full terms and early elections have ushered in new 
parties and governments. Following its 1989 transition from Communism, 
Bulgaria underwent a period of political instability, with governments 
falling before completing their full term in office. As of 1997, Bulgaria’s 
governments became more stable, yet none was re-elected. Governments 
led by the United Democratic Forces (1997–2001), the National Movement 
of King Simeon II (2001–05) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) led 
by Sergei Stanishev (2005–09) quickly lost popularity because they failed 
to deliver on their pre-election promises and to raise living standards. 
Although a new party, Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria 
(GERB), led by Boyko Borisov, won successive elections in 2009, 2013 and 
2014, stability remained elusive. Borisov’s government was replaced by the 
short-lived government of Plamen Oresharski (2013–14) and he lost the 
2016 presidential election to the BSP candidate, Rumen Radev. Corruption 
was a recurring theme in the elections of 2009 and 2013.17
16  For Bulgaria, European Commission, ‘On Progress in Bulgaria under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism’, Brussels, 27 January 2016, pp. 2–9 <http://
ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2016_40_en.pdf> [accessed 16 August 2016]. For Romania, 
European Commission, ‘On Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism’, Brussels, 27 January 2016, pp. 2, 11, 12 <http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/
com_2016_41_en.pdf> [accessed 16 August 2016]. For Greece, European Council. 
‘Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the Hellenic 
Republic and the Bank of Greece’, 19 August 2015, pp. 31–32 <http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/pdf/01_mou_20150811_en.pdf> 
[accessed 16 August 2016].
17  Alexander Stoyanov, Ruslan Stefano and Boryana Velcheva, ‘Bulgarian Anti-
Corruption Reforms: A Lost Decade?’, Working Paper No. 42, April 2014 <http://www.
againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WP-3-Diagnosis-of-Corruption-in-
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 Until 2010, Greek governments were by contrast given a second chance. 
The centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) won successive 
mandates in 1996 and 2000, while the centre-right New Democracy won 
the 2004 and 2007 elections. This pattern was suspended in 2009, after 
the victory of Pasok which had to resort to EU rescue mechanisms in 
2010 to avoid a sovereign default. Subsequently, the traditional centre-left 
vs. centre-right cleavage was replaced by pro-austerity vs. anti-austerity. 
Pasok and New Democracy governed in coalition from 2011–14 but 
were toppled in January 2015 when the largest anti-austerity party, the 
radical-left Syriza, won the parliamentary elections. Syriza campaigned 
on a radical agenda, but subsequently failed to implement it. Cornered 
by Greece’s creditors in July 2015, Syriza called snap elections and won a 
fresh mandate in September 2015. This time, Syriza took a more balanced 
approach, promising to follow austerity policies while ensuring that they 
would not further impoverish middle- and lower-income groups. While 
there was some academic interest in corruption before the eruption of 
the financial crisis in 2008, for most of the 2000s Greek politics revolved 
around economic-policy choices. The pattern was suspended in 2009, after 
the victory of Pasok which had to resort to EU rescue mechanisms in 2010 
in order to avoid a sovereign default.
 Romania’s transition from Communism to capitalism entailed first and 
foremost a shift from Eastern/Russian political influence to a Western/
EU political affiliation. The political spectrum did not offer a wide array 
of options, as most parties had similar agendas which were developed 
top-down, from parliamentary debates, rather than from grassroots 
constituencies. These agendas were heavily influenced by international 
constraints regarding the supremacy of the neoliberal market and EU 
accession. Consequently, political parties had few policy options other 
than to observe the substantive policy commitments related to EU-entry 
while seeking at the same time not to destroy their own popularity.18 The 
issue of corruption appeared on the political agenda from around 2000 
and gained increasing prominence over the coming years, taking centre 
stage after 2010. In 2000 the Social Democratic Party (PSD) — which relied 
heavily on the former Communist Party for human resources — won 
election as a result of popular disappointment provoked by the perceived 
failure of the outgoing right-wing governing coalition to cope with the 
deepening economic crisis. Four years later, a liberal-democratic coalition 
Bulgaria-new.pdf> [accessed 28 September 2015].
18  Adrian Miroiu and Şerban Cerkez, Competitia politica in Romania, Iaşi, 2013.
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replaced the PSD as the governing entity and maintained this position 
over two terms. The new government declared that fighting corruption 
would be its main priority.19 Monica Macovei, a prosecutor during the 
Communist period and a civil society activist during the transition, was 
appointed Minister of Justice and emerged as leader of the anti-corruption 
movement. On 1 January 2007 Romania joined the EU.20 In 2012, the 
PSD won election again but, amid popular discontent and accusations of 
corruption, the PSD-led government was replaced by a technocratic one in 
November 2015. 
 An important comparative dimension in the present study is the 
peculiarities of entrepreneurial culture in the three countries. In Bulgaria 
and Romania, the transition from Communism to capitalism saw the 
emergence of new elites which aimed to amass both political and economic 
capital. These new ‘business politicians’21 used their political influence to 
gain access to formerly state-owned enterprises that were then declared 
bankrupt and bought at significant discounts. On the one hand, the 
new ‘biznizmen’22 became ‘political investors’ by financing individual 
politicians and political parties; on the other, politicians created their 
own trusted circles in private companies.23 Networks of businessmen and 
politicians also sought to enhance their profits and political influence by 
engaging in swaps of state-owned land, rigged bids in public procurement, 
absorption of EU funds and access to state subsidies for targeted business 
endeavours.24 In such contexts, the classic public-private divide (on which 
the definition of corruption is based) loses meaning as there is no clear 
distinction between state officials and private business interests.
 Such practices that favoured the powerful of the day established the 
patterns of grand corruption which, coupled with popular dissatisfaction 
with Bulgaria’s living standards, led to sustained popular protests against 
the political influence of big private interests. In June 2013, for example, 
19  European Commission, ‘Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession’, 
Brussels, 2005.
20  Romanian officials were less appreciative of Mrs Macovei’s efforts and the Senate 
voted a motion against her which led to her dismissal. Her successor, Mr Tudor Chiuariu, 
spent less than a year in office and was dismissed by President Băsescu when charged in a 
corruption case.
21  Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources 
and Mechanisms of Political Corruption, New York, 1999.
22  This was typically a male-dominated field.
23  Stoyanov et al. ‘Bulgarian Anti-Corruption Reforms’, p. 15.
24  Ruslan Stefanov, ‘Energy and Good Governance in Bulgaria: Trends and Policy Options’, 
Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2011 <http://www.risk.boku.ac.at/download/pub/2011/
ENERGY-AND-GOOD-GOVERNANCE-IN-BULGARIA.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2015].
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the Oresharski government’s move to appoint media mogul Delyan 
Peevski to head the State Agency for National Security provoked massive 
public discontent. In November 2015, Romania’s Social Democratic prime-
minister Victor Ponta resigned in reponse to public protests accusing him 
of corruption and incompetence. On that occasion, popular discontent was 
sparked by a fire in a Bucharest night club in which more than sixty young 
people died.25
Anti-corruption through the lens of social constructionism 
In order to analyse anti-corruption practices from a comparative 
perspective, this article employs a distinctively social constructionist 
approach,26 arguing that the meaning of corruption is context-contingent, 
while anti-corruption is a contemporary form of political frame rather than 
a technical solution to the ‘corruption problem’. It examines how claims 
about corruption have been constructed in the three countries under 
review, and how such claims affected anti-corruption policies and their 
implementation at local level. From this perspective, corruption and anti-
corruption are not self-evident ideas, but the outcomes of social actions 
and political interventions. This article considers that (anti)corruption 
comprises both a set of ideas (knowledge) — as corruption has become a 
growing, heterogeneous and powerful field of academic inquiry — and a 
range of practices, actions and interventions (power) since anti-corruption 
has become a site in which activists work, a field of ‘policy expertise’.
 Our starting point is the Thomas theorem27 — a classic sociological 
theory that states that, if people ‘define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences’. In other words, reality is a matter of definition since 
the definition determines the course of action. In the late 1960s, Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckman28 argued that social order is the result of 
past human activity and exists only insofar as human activity continues 
to reproduce it. They argued that the process of social construction 
involves 1) the construction of society as an objective reality through 
25  <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678282-protests-about-deadly-nightclub-
fire-have-toppled-romanias-government-they-have-yet-change>. 
26  Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; Stuart Hall, Chas 
Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the 
State and Law and Order, 2nd edn, London, 2013; Dick Hobbs, Lush Life: Constructing 
Organized Crime in the UK, Oxford, 2013; Mark Granovetter, ‘The Social Construction 
of Corruption’, in Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg (eds), On Capitalism, Stanford, CA, 
2007, pp. 152–72.
27  Formulated in 1928 by W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas (1899–1977).
28  Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality.
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institutionalization (the creation of new rules, laws and customs) and 
legitimation (ensuring continuity of such rules) and 2) the construction 
of society as a subjective reality based on internalization (by means of 
socialization and identity). Through language, new meanings are assigned 
to old facts, which in turn become ‘institutions’ through the setup of new 
rules and laws, thus gaining social recognition as ‘permanent’ solutions to 
‘permanent’ problems.29
 Using this approach we argue, in line with Mark Granovetter,30 that 
corruption is not a ‘natural’ but rather a ‘social’ fact. The very definition 
of corruption is a site of negotiation between academics and practitioners. 
Furthermore, over the past two decades the concept of corruption has 
gradually expanded to include more and more arenas of behaviour. 
Concomitantly, anti-corruption has also expanded to include a set of 
practices carried out by various societies seeking to curb corruption. 
Arnold Heidenheimer31 argues that three key concepts shape the debate 
over corruption: public opinion, public interest and public office. Public 
opinion-centred definitions focus on the public’s understanding of 
corruption, thus turning public opinion into the judge of corruption. Public 
interest definitions suggest that, through corruption, the public interest is 
violated in favour of a small group.32  Criticized for their vagueness,33 the 
concepts of public interest and public opinion were deemed unsuitable for 
policy purposes, rendering corruption ‘unmeasurable’. Definitions centred 
on public office34 focus on the distinction between public and private and 
the misuse of public power. This view was quickly adopted by international 
organizations including the WB, the IMF and Transparency International 
(TI), which define corruption as the abuse of public power for private 
gain. This view has been widely legitimized by TI through its Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), published since 1995.35
29  This constructionist view has been instrumentally employed to shed light on 
contemporary anxieties typically portrayed using vocabularies of crime such as 
mugging (Hall, Policing the Crisis); corruption (Granovetter, ‘The Social Construction of 
Corruption’), organized crime (Hobbs, Lush Life).
30  Granovetter, ‘The Social Construction of Corruption’.
31  Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ‘Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption’, in Arnold 
J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, Michael LeVine and Victorio Tanzi (eds), Political 
Corruption: A Handbook, London, 1970, pp. 149–63.
32  Carl J. Friedrich, ‘Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective’, in ibid.
33  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and 
Reform, Cambridge, 1999.
34  Gunnar Myrda, Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Povery of Nations, vol. 2, New 
York, 1968; Joseph Samuel Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis’, The American Political Science Review, 61, 1967, 2, pp. 417–27.
35  Frederik Galtung, ‘Criteria for Sustainable Corruption Control’, The European 
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 Corruption interpretations and anti-corruption practices were brought 
into existence by social events36 linked to specific contexts and ideologies. 
The idea that corruption could be measured — that countries could be 
ranked according to an index — proved so appealing to the international 
community that TI’s CPI became a powerful advocacy tool, despite its 
methodological shortcomings.37 By the end of the 1990s, the conventional 
paradigm of corruption had begun to dominate international debate on 
the basis of three main assumptions: corruption could be defined, it could 
be measured and it could be tackled. Recent scholarship38 describes a 
massive failure of the conventional paradigm, showing that 1) the present 
definition of corruption assumes a clear distinction between the public and 
private spheres which hardly grasps the complexity of everyday activities; 
2) contemporary measurement-tools account mostly for the perception 
of corruption; however, assessments have started to incorporate evidence 
about experience and several objective measures of corruption have 
recently been developed;39 3) either anti-corruption policies implemented 
on the basis of current research methodologies have failed, or the present 
research instruments are incapable of capturing the nature and scope of 
reforms.40
 In order to explain this failure, we take a historically informed view to 
explore the ways in which anti-corruption was sustained by institutional 
contexts and redefinition of rules, the creation of new forms of ‘expertise’ 
and the emergence of new actors, taking into account the relationship 
between knowledge (experts) and power (practices). In so doing, we 
move away from the Weberian model of bureaucracy41 and the Western 
dichotomist view of public-private/state-society that leaves no room for 
positive contributions to the understanding of corruption.
 Last but not least, we show that anti-corruption is not apolitical. 
Together with Italo Pardo and Giulianno Prato, we suggest that the state 
Journal of Development Research, 10, 1998, 1, pp. 105–28.
36  Pierre Bourdieu, ‘La Force du Droit’, Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 64, 
1986, pp. 3–19; Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, Cambridge, MA, 2000; Ian 
Hacking (ed.), Historical Ontology, Cambridge, MA, 2002.
37  See more on CPI methodology and recent changes at <http://www.transparency.org/
files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIUpdatedMethodology_EMBARGO_EN.pdf>.
38  Ledeneva, ‘A Critique of the Global Corruption “Paradigm”’.
39  Miriam Golden and Lucio Picci, ‘Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, 
Illustrated with Italian Data’, Economics and Politics, 17, 2005, pp. 37–75.
40  Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, ‘The Failure of Anticorruption Policies: 
A Theoretical Mischaracterisation of the Problem’, QoG Working Paper Series, 2010, 19.
41  G. Anders and M. Nuijten (eds), Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal 
Anthropological Perspective, London, 2009.
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may be an active agent that ‘through institutional blindness can allow the 
interests of the elites’.42 This approach renders more opaque the borders of 
legality exploited by power elites who, through law, give significance to and 
legitimize corruption. Dieter Haller and Chris Shore43 focus on practices 
that make corruption a semantic of governance, thereby suggesting that it 
is a common way to make sense of politics. Davide Torsello44 has described 
how environmental movements have used corruption talk (allegations or 
facts) to frame their protests and communicate with the wider public. This 
strategy builds on the generalized public talk sustained by media reports 
and locals’ high levels of perceived corruption, enhancing the users’ 
legitimacy through positive associations with an anti-corruption agenda.
 To sum up, based on our reading of the literature, we analyse anti-
corruption in the three countries under study as a process that involves 
a series of discrete steps: definition of the problem, institutionalization, 
legitimation and politicization. Far from being inherent to modernization, 
anti-corruption processes are the result of social and political manipulation 
and have been instrumental to various political regimes. We look at our 
three case-studies with this matrix (Table 1) in mind. 
Creating the ‘problem’: The evolution of corruption and understandings of 
corruption within the historical context of Bulgaria, Greece and Romania
This section focuses on the first stage of the anti-corruption process (see 
Table 1). It shows that, over the past fifteen years, corruption has become 
a recurring theme in the three countries because of popular discontent, 
civil-society reactions and political usage of the term. Opinion polls have 
effectively put corruption at the front of public debates, signalling it as 
a major social problem. At the same time, however, anti-corruption has 
become a top policy priority only in Romania. 
 Corruption was installed in the public imagination as a major problem 
with the use of measuring devices,45 which created the impression of 
authenticity regarding the spread and forms of the phenomenon. This 
not only legitimized the anti-corruption agenda, but transformed it into a 
powerful narrative of governance. International organizations, such as TI
42  Italo Pardo and Giulianna Prato (eds), Between Morality and the Law. Corruption, 
Anthropology and Comparative Society, London, 2004, p. 6.
43  Dieter Haller and Chris Shore (eds), Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives, 
London, 2005.
44  Davide Torsello, The New Environmentalism? Civil Society and Corruption in the 
Enlarged EU, Abingdon and New York, 2012.
45  Ledeneva, ‘A Critique of the Global Corruption “Paradigm”’.
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Table 1. A social constructionist view of anti-corruption policies and practices
Anti-corruption as a process: 
stages
Indicators
The evolution of the 
understanding of corruption 
as a social problem and 
policy priority
•  Policy interest vs policy priority
•  Public concern
•  Priority for the criminal justice system




•  Level of institutional development (for 
example, legislation, number of institutions 
designated to tackle corruption)
•  Resources assigned to institutions (for 
example, human, material, informational, 
financial)
The implementation of anti-
corruption
•  Clear measurable progress vs 
‘implementation gap’
•  Unintended consequences of anti-corruption 
policies (for example, new forms of expertise 




•  The frequency of corruption as a narrative in 
the public space
•  Political opponents accuse one another of 
corruption on a regular basis
•  Anti-corruption institutions are heavily 
scrutinized by non-state actors (may be 
accused of political subordination)
(by means of its CPI, Bribe Payers Index and Global Barometer of 
Corruption), Freedom House, the WB and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) produce their own composite 
indexes. Figure 1 shows the trends of corruption in the three countries 
using the WB’s ‘control of corruption’ index.46 Despite the index’s 
methodological shortcomings,47 Figure 1 shows that while corruption is a 
46  The index ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. See the 
World Bank website for more details: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.
aspx#home>.
47  For a thorough critique of composite indexes regarding corruption, see Heywood in 
this volume. For more methodological details regarding this index, see the World Bank 
website: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.
through the lens of social constructionism 129
problem for all three countries under study, it remains a matter of timing 
and degree.
Figure 1: Control of corruption indicator (World Bank 1998–2014)
Further to composite indexes, corruption has been objectified through 
surveys, opinion polls and victimization studies. Regularly conducted 
(for example, the Romanian Barometer of Opinion is conducted yearly), 
such instruments began by the end of 2010 to include questions regarding 
corruption, indicating that it had become seen as a top social problem 
by then. In Bulgaria, for example, the number of people who considered 
corruption to be the most serious social problem doubled in five years from 
31 per cent in 2004 to 65 per cent in 2009.48
 The ideology of numbers was systematically sustained by the ideology 
of high-profile corrupt individuals who escaped justice for a long time, 
thereby increasing popular dissatisfaction. In September 2015, for example, 
Romanian prime minister Victor Ponta went on trial on charges of fraud, 
tax evasion and money-laundering allegedly committed in his former 
career as a lawyer. Earlier that same year the former Romanian Minister 
of Sports and Youth Affairs, Monica Iacob Ridzi, had received a five-year 
prison sentence for side-lining funds from her ministry, while Elena Udrea, 
former Minister of Tourism, was arrested on corruption charges.49 In 
April 2008, Bulgarian Interior Minister Rumen Petkov resigned following 
48  Lyubomir Todorakov, ‘A Diagnosis of Corruption in Bulgaria’, European Research 
Centre for Anticorruption and State-building, Working Paper, No. 3, September 2013, 
p. 2 <http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WP-3-Diagnosis-of-
Corruption-in-Bulgaria-new.pdf> [accessed 28 September 2015].
49  Elena Udrea was subsequently released.
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accusations that he had failed to prevent police officers passing state secrets 
to organized crime networks. In July 2010, Sergei Stanishev was accused 
of withholding secret service files with sensitive information regarding 
organized crime that he had acquired while serving as Bulgarian prime 
minister in 2005–09. More recently, in June 2014, Bulgaria’s KTB bank was 
declared insolvent amid accusations of corruption involving member of 
parliament Delyan Peevski and businessman Tzvetan Vassilev.50
 Greece has had its own high-profile corruption cases involving, for 
example, former deputy prime minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos and Vassilis 
Papageorgopoulos, mayor of Thessaloniki, the country’s second largest 
city. The former was sentenced to twenty years in prison on charges 
of money-laundering and bribe-taking; an appeal was ongoing at the 
time of writing. The latter was initially sentenced to life imprisonment, 
subsequently reduced to twelve years, on charges of embezzling €18 billion 
from public funds. He was subsequently released from prison on health 
grounds.
 Civil society was instrumental in projecting corruption as one of the 
top social problems and a typified model of anti-corruption. More flexible 
than the public sphere and also more dependent on external funding,51 
the third sector organized coalitions to gain a stronger voice, campaigned 
for judicial reform, and pressured politicians to meet their electoral 
commitments. In Bulgaria, for example, civil society (represented by, 
among other organizations, TI, the Open Society Institute, the Centre for 
the Study of Democracy and the Centre for Liberal Strategies) played an 
active role in seeking to prevent corruption and organized crime: during 
the late 1990s it organized ‘Coalition 2000’, conducted research on and 
monitored anti-corruption, and closely monitored judicial reform; after 
2007 it used EU structural funding to enable the modernization of public 
administration.52
 In Romania, the third sector’s concern over corruption spread to the 
public sphere, especially after the Democratic Liberal Party took power 
50  This proves once more that public-private division is merely a theoretical abstraction, 
as in this context entrepreneurs and politicians engage in various transactions undisturbed 
by definitional issues.
51  The semantic expansion of corruption was doubled by the development of the anti-
corruption market. Michael Bryan estimates that by 2009 the ‘fight against corruption’, 
particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, had become a multi-billion 
dollar industry. For more details see Michael Bryan and Donald Bowser, ‘The Evolution of 
the Anti-Corruption Industry in the Third Wave of Anti-Corruption Work’, Proceedings 
from the Konstanz Anti-Corruption Conference (2009) <http://works.bepress.com/bryane_
michael/50>.
52  Todorakov, ‘A Diagnosis of Corruption in Bulgaria’, pp. 10–16.
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in 2005 and worked to develop a solid partnership with civil society. 
Between 2005–12, an anti-corruption ethos that aimed to reform the whole 
of society was translated into awareness campaigns, emergency call-lines, 
opinion polls, workshops, meetings and training sessions. Using ‘Poland 
and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies’ (PHARE) 
funding, the Justice Ministry conducted a €1.8 million anti-corruption 
campaign from October 2007 to February 2008. The Ministry of European 
Integration ran an anti-corruption campaign with the slogan, ‘I do not 
give bribes – I do not take bribes’ (E.U. nu dau spaga – E.U. nu iau spaga). 
Based on word-play, the message was that EU member-states do not engage 
in corruption. The General Anti-Corruption Directorate (DGA) and the 
National Integrity Agency (ANI) popularized the free-of-charge ‘Green 
Line’ (TelVerde) telephone system that citizens could use to report crimes 
committed by officials, while the Fight against Fraud Department (DLAF) 
focused on preventing fraud related to the EU budget. Partnerships 
and strategic alliances between civil society and state institutions were 
established. For example, the DGA cooperated with the Romanian Postal 
Service to run a publicity campaign called ‘No more envelopes!’ (Gata cu 
plicurile!) whereby all envelopes and receipts issued to the public were 
stamped with anti-corruption messages and information about the ‘Green 
Line’.
 In Greece, by comparison, civil society was less mobilized on corruption-
related issues. Even so, grassroots campaigns were launched to collect 
information on corruption through social media. One example was the 
Facebook page ‘over and done with’ (teleia kai pavla)53 where citizens could 
anonymously declare where and when they have been asked for bribes. In 
2013, TI Greece established an anti-corruption hotline. Another hotline 
was made available at the Internal Affairs Division of the Greek police, 
while in autumn 2016 the government announced its intention to establish 
a new service for reporting corruption.
 Campaigns such as these, together with the demands of international 
financial institutions and the business community, have transformed 
the fight against corruption into a coordinated campaign, with ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’54 employing a range of strategies. So far, Romania has 
had four anti-corruption strategies, each reflecting a change in the ‘fight 
against corruption’. The first anti-corruption strategy (SNA I 2001–04) 
aimed to align political and penal semiotics by making the legislative 
framework relating to corruption as comprehensive as possible. The second 
53  Available at <https://el-gr.facebook.com/teleiakaipavla/>.
54  Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, New York, 1963.
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strategy (SNA II 2005–07) aimed to establish an institutional architecture 
dedicated to monitoring and preventing corruption. The third strategy 
(SNA III 2008–11) focused on vulnerable sectors and local administration. 
The fourth strategy (2012–17)55 is focused on prevention mechanisms 
such as the implementation of integrity codes and preserving the existing 
institutional environment.56
 Bulgaria has also benefited from a number of anti-corruption strategies, 
the earliest dating from 2001. Bulgaria’s latest, five-year national anti-
corruption strategy of 2015, contains thirty-three specific measures in 
six primary areas, but prioritizes the fight against corruption within the 
highest levels of government.
 Since January 2013, Greece has had a national anti-corruption action 
plan (Ministry of Justice 2013). This is a roadmap drafted with the help 
of the Task Force for Greece, a technical assistance team made available 
to the Greek government by the EC to assist in structural reforms. The 
strategy was upgraded and modified by the government in August 2015, 
just before the snap elections called for September 2015. Since then, 
however, government instability has had a negative impact on the design 
and implementation of the promised anti-corruption measures.
 While the fight against corruption has become more substantial 
in all three countries, their respective societies are marked by strong 
currents of discontent. Bulgaria, for instance, saw repeated anti-corruption 
demonstrations in 2013–14, ‘revealing an increase in public sensitivity to 
political corruption’.57 Citizens were disappointed by the mixed results 
of Bulgaria’s integration into the EU and angry at the austerity measures 
taken by successive governments. In Romania, November 2015 saw a 
change in government brought about by massive street protests that 
coalesced around the issue of corruption.58 In Greece, elections in 2012 and 
2015 focused on the theme of corruption; the New Democracy party won 
55  This Strategy was initially designed to cover the period 2012–15, but on 9 September 
2015 the government prolonged its implementation date until 31 December 2017.
56  Several anti-corruption strategies included as an objective improving on the CPI 
index, probably assuming that this was an objective measure.
57  Interview with political analyst, Sofia, 15 March 2015.
58  The issue here is more complex, as the Romanian demonstrations were sparked by a 
fire in a nightclub that killed many people. During the investigations, it became apparent 
that the club had obtained its licences by informal payments or sheer bribery since it did 
not comply with regulations. Counterintuitively, the protests were less against the private 
owners of the club, who were seen as ‘victims of a corrupt system’, and more against 
the public sphere and the prime minister Victor Ponta, who were perceived as the ‘real’ 
perpetrators.
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the elections of 2012 by a small margin but was voted out of power in early 
2015.
 The aim of this section has been to show that corruption has become a 
sensitive issue over the past fifteen years and remains a recurring theme in 
local politics. Public pressure to identify those to blame for the deepening 
economic crisis combined with pressure from external actors (notably 
the EU and the IMF) to ‘solve their corruption issues’ shifted the focus to 
grand corruption. Table 2 summarizes the key findings. While in Bulgaria 
anti-corruption remains an important element in the public sphere, only 
in Romania has anti-corruption become a key policy priority. In Greece, by 
contrast, anti-corruption has never been a major priority either for political 
parties campaigning for election or for governments drafting their policy 
programmes. These different approaches are of vital importance for the 
next part of our analysis, since they play a key role in the construction of 
anti-corruption practices at local level.
Table 2. Corruption as a social problem and policy priority: Comparing 
Bulgaria, Greece and Romania
Bulgaria Greece Romania
Evolution of the 
understanding 
of corruption as 
a social problem 
and policy 
priority
•  Policy priority 
at declaration 
level, but little 
action
•  Public concern
•  No priority for 
criminal justice 
system
•  Policy interest, 
but not enough 
to secure the 
necessary 
resources




•  No priority for 
criminal justice 
system
•  Top policy 
priority
•  Public concern
•  Criminal justice 
system priority
Creating the ‘solution’: Institutions and resources made available to tackle 
corruption in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania 
After looking at the ways in which corruption was constructed as an issue 
in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, this section analyses the institutional 
solutions put in place to solve the ‘problem of corruption’ (referred to in 
our theoretical model as the second stage — see Table 1). In so doing, 
we look at two main aspects: 1) the legal codification of corruption in 
general and of ‘grand corruption’ in particular and 2) formal institutions 
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with competences in the area of corruption monitoring and prevention. 
Even though the three countries made use of rather similar tools and 
strategies, their development and efficiency have been very different. 
Whereas Romania has a clear legal definition of grand corruption as 
defined by Law 78/2000, Greece has only a vague approach and Bulgaria 
is still struggling to find one. Furthermore, Romania has a strong anti-
corruption institution, the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA); 
this was specially designed to tackle grand corruption and has achieved 
impressive results over the years. Greece has set up several anti-corruption 
prosecutorial offices and, since February 2015, a General Secretariat for 
Anti-Corruption within the Justice Ministry, but both the Ministry and 
the Secretariat are under-staffed and under-resourced. Bulgaria is still in 
the process of establishing its first anti-corruption prosecutorial office. 
Meanwhile, all three countries recognize that both the general public and 
international organizations are justified in expressing concern over the 
potential abuse of tailor-made anti-corruption institutions, especially in 
light of the highly-politicized environment of each country. In Romania, 
for example, suspicions have been voiced that the DNA might act in 
accordance with political commands and create files on opponents of those 
in power.59
 Formal attempts to define corruption in Romanian legislation are 
relatively recent. Before the 1989 revolution, the 1969 Criminal Code 
mentioned corruption only in two distinct cases: corruption of a minor for 
sexual purposes and corrupting a witness to commit perjury.60 Neither of 
these cases had much in common with the present understanding of the 
concept, which generally refers to ‘the abuse of public office for private 
gain’.61 In 2000, the Romanian parliament adopted the first law62 using the 
modern understanding of corruption. That law also laid the ground for a 




60  Dorinica Ioan, Dan Banciu, Sorin M. Rădulescu (eds), Corupţia în România. Realitate 
şi percepţie socială, Bucharest, 2005. The crimes that incorporated the modern meaning of 
corruption were instead grouped under ‘Crimes in relation to work’ and were decoded as 
bribe giving, bribe taking, trading influence and receiving undue goods (Articles 254 – 57, 
Criminal Code 1969). However, the concept of corruption was never used in relation to 
these crimes.
61  The World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, 
Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 8.
62  Law 78/2000 on preventing, discovering and sanctioning of corruption acts.
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prejudice resulting from corruption crimes is more than €200,000 or leads 
to a serious malfunction of the activity of a public institution/authority, or 
the value of the goods traded through corruption is higher than €10,000; 
2) a crime committed by one of the following: a member of parliament, 
member of the government, state secretary, judge, employee of the National 
Bank of Romania, military or police officer, mayor, lawyer, member of the 
Financial Guard, border control officer; 3) a crime against the financial 
interests of the EU. By 2003, anti-corruption was delivered in packages. 
For example, Law 161/2003 (labelled, along with Law 52/2003, as the Anti-
Corruption Package) criminalized conflicts of interest; prohibited high-
ranking public servants (members of the government, state secretaries and 
sub-secretaries, prefects and sub-prefects) from adopting administrative or 
judicial acts that would result in benefit for themselves, their partners or a 
close relative; defined new categories of incompatibility for public servants; 
modified and clarified other laws regarding corruption (for example, Law 
188/1999 and Law 78/2000).
 In Greece, the legal definition of grand corruption is vague, covering 
cases that involve high-ranking officials and crimes of ‘considerable social 
and/or public interest’ (Law 4022/2011). The law63 covers crimes related to 
the discharge of duties by high-ranking officials including government 
minsters, members of parliament, general and special secretaries of 
ministries, presidents, governors and chief executive officers of public 
bodies, state-owned or state-managed enterprises and mayors (article 1 of 
Law 4022/2011).64 As in Romania, anti-corruption policies in Greece were 
adopted under pressure from international organizations, particularly 
following the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis. For example, 
in 2011 the Greek government established a new Authority on Public 
Tenders and Contracts; in 2013 it strengthened controls on politicians 
and public officials; and in 2014 Greece adopted legislation on whistle-
blowing in the public sector, the financing of political parties, and public 
procurement. This new codification of corruption was accompanied by 
a reform of the justice system aimed at ensuring the rigorous application 
of the new legislation and putting anti-corruption structures at centre 
stage. This involved two types of institutional reform: 1) setting up new 
63  Voted in September 2011
64  Relevant Greek legislation included Law 4013/2011 on the new Authority on Public 
Tenders and Contracts; Law 4170/2013 on the Anti-corruption prosecutors; Law 4254/2014 
on whistle-blowing in the public sector; Law 4281/2014 on public procurement; and Law 
4304/2014 on political-party financing. The new Anti-corruption Secretariat was founded 
by Law 4320/2015.
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specially designated anti-corruption institutions and 2) reforming the 
traditional justice and home affairs system to include new anti-corruption 
departments and/or competences. 
 In Romania, the main institution dealing with grand corruption is 
the National Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office (PNA), set up in 2002 
at the behest of the EU and with €2 million funding through a PHARE 
programme. As the aim of PNA was to target high-level corruption, it 
focused on cases involving high-ranking officials, and/or sums higher 
than €100,000. To reflect the importance of this new institution, PNA 
prosecutors were paid 40 per cent more than their counterparts in the 
General Prosecutor’s Office in recognition of the fact that they were dealing 
with high-level corruption.65 This, coupled with a lack of transparency 
in the selection process, created resentment among employees of the 
General Prosecutor’s Office.66 Ironically, therefore, Romania’s main anti-
corruption institution was from its inception suspected of corruption. 
In 2006, the institution was reformed and renamed the National Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DNA). Since then, it has built a strong reputation 
as a body capable of dealing with grand corruption; as a result of its work, 
one prime minister, several government ministers and several high-profile 
entrepreneurs have been investigated and put on trial.
 In Bulgaria, tackling grand corruption has long been an objective. 
Anti-corruption agencies such as the State National Security Agency 
(DANS) and the advisory agency BORCOR, were established under the 
Stanishev (2005–09) and Borisov (2009–13) governments. Anti-corruption 
efforts heightened in June 2015, when Deputy Prime Minister Magdalena 
Kuneva announced plans to establish a new anti-corruption bureau, 
independent of the government, which would track corruption among top 
officials.67 The new unit was mooted to become operational in 2016, receive 
asset declarations from top officials, and focus on asset verification.68 
However, the first attempt to establish the bureau was rebuffed by the 
Bulgarian parliament on the grounds that it had the potential to become 
too autonomous and thereby exert disproportionate influence over elected 
65  Freedom House, Politicile anticorupţie ale Guvernului României. Raport de evaluare, 
Bucharest, 2005.
66  Ibid., p. 82.
67  The persons covered by this law are the president, the prime minister, ministers, 
members of parliament, prosecutors, mayors, municipal councilors and heads of public 
hospitals and customs offices.
68  Angel Krasimirov, ‘Bulgaria Gives Green Light to Set Anti-Corruption Unit’, 
Reuters, 17 June 2015 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/17/us-bulgaria-corruption-
idUSKBN0OX1LQ20150617> [accessed 30 September 2015].
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officials and civil servants. For example, parliamentarians expressed 
concern about the bureau’s power to open investigations on the basis 
of anonymous tip-offs.69 Kuneva tried again in spring 2016, presenting 
parliament with a new and updated proposal for an anti-corruption 
bureau. This new bill was approved by parliamentary committee but was 
still being debated by the full parliament in summer 2016.
 While grand corruption has not been a top policy priority for the 
Bulgarian government (see Table 2), Bulgaria does have in place a 
dedicated anti-corruption institutional framework. All anti-corruption 
efforts are coordinated by the Commission to Prevent and Combat 
Corruption (CPCC), which was established in 2006. This Commission 
coordinates specifically designated anti-corruption committees in the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches. Furthermore, the judiciary, 
the ombudsman, the inspectorate services in each ministerial department 
and the Public Financial Inspection Agency (PFIA, or audit office) are 
complemented by a host of institutions tasked with fighting corruption; 
these are larger in number and narrower in terms of competence compared 
to the corresponding Romanian institutions.70
 Compared to the situation in Romania and even Bulgaria, anti-
corruption cannot be said to have taken centre-stage in Greek politics, 
where corruption is considered a symptom, rather than a cause, of the 
general malaise affecting the country. However, in the context of the 
public outcry related to the 2010 economic crisis of the Greek state, which 
brought the country to the brink of sovereign default, anti-corruption 
gained impetus. Several new anti-corruption institutions were created, 
though the resources made available to them proved mostly insufficient. 
The post of anti-corruption coordinator was established in 2013 by the 
coalition government of New Democracy and Pasok. The coordinator 
was assigned the task of coordinating anti-corruption measures across 
the state agencies and locating loopholes in Greek criminal law and 
criminal procedure legislation. The post was abolished in March 2015 by 
the coalition government of Syriza and the nationalist party Independent 
Greeks (Anel). The latter coalition created a new General Secretariat for 
Anti-Corruption and replaced the coordinator with a new, autonomous 
69  In other words, Bulgarian parliamentarians questioned the extraordinary mandate 
given to anti-corruption prosecutors and decided to vote against that.
70  There are six such institutions: Public Financial Inspection Agency, National 
Audit Office, General Inspectorate, State Agency for National Security, Commission for 
Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest, Commission for the Establishing 
of Property Acquired from Criminal Activity.
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ministerial post, the Minister for Anti-Corruption. In September 2015 the 
same coalition government abolished this post and replaced it with the 
Alternate Minister for Anti-Corruption, a position now subsumed under 
the Justice Ministry. During the short life-span of the post (2013–15), the 
Minister for Anti-Corruption concentrated on tackling tax evasion, but 
evidently lacked the resources or time to carry out the tasks assigned. Two 
positions of anti-corruption prosecutors were established in 2013 (serving 
Athens and Thessaloniki) with the aim of tackling corruption in the 
public sector and in banking. Other institutions that have more general 
competences in tackling corruption or crimes associated with corruption 
are the General Inspector of Public Administration (set up in 2002)71 and 
the Financial Intelligence Unit (restructured in 2008).72
 Table 3 sums up the findings of this section which has looked at the 
anti-corruption institutional setting, focusing on the legal codification 
of corruption and the institutional environment with competences in 
the area of corruption as outlined in Table 1. The findings point to the 
conclusion that Romania is the most active of the three countries in the 
area of anti-corruption, having a strong legal framework and institutional 
establishment. With a similar historical background and in light of recent 
developments, Bulgaria has an institutional framework to tackle corruption 
which is not used to its maximum potential. Last, but not least, Greece is 
only now setting up a proper framework for tackling corruption, struggling 
to put adequate anti-corruption mechanisms in place.
‘The problem’ and ‘the solution’: Comparing the implementation of anti-
corruption policies in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania 
This section looks at the match between the ‘problem of corruption’ 
(which is a continuous work in progress as described in Section 3 and 
in Tables 1, 2 and 3) and the institutional ‘solutions’ that have been put 
in place (as described in Section 4). It focuses on what has changed as a 
71  It is responsible for preventing and monitoring maladministration (such as undue 
delays or discrimination affecting citizens) and corruption in the wider public sector, 
including state-owned enterprises. The GIPA’s role is threefold, as it includes inspecting 
administrative staff, procedures and units, taking disciplinary action against public 
employees violating the law, and coordinating different bodies of inspectors based in 
individual ministries. It is an independent public authority and the person who becomes 
head of the GIPA is selected by the government, but must be approved by the parliament.
72  It focuses on examining suspicious transactions by natural persons and legal entities, 
asset declarations of public officials, including ministers, members of parliament, advisors 
to ministers as well as journalists. It is also in charge of monitoring money-laundering and 
terrorist financing.
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result of anti-corruption policies, what has remained the same (dubbed 
an ‘implementation gap’ in corruption literature)73 and some unintended 
consequences of anti-corruption policies and practices.







•  Institutions 
exist, but do not 
function well




•  Newly set up 
institutions
•  Low level 
resources
•  Legislation exists 
but is vague and 
recently adopted 
(after 2010)
•  Top EU level 
institutions that 
are templates for 
other countries




 Despite the pessimistic view that labels all three countries as ‘corrupt’, 
they have undoubtedly made significant progress as a direct result of 
anti-corruption policies and practices. Putting anti-corruption on the 
public agenda, either as a policy priority or as a blaming tool to express 
dissatisfaction with internal affairs or political opponents, has led to 
positive changes.74 Such changes tend to be most visible in Romania, 
due to the specific context that made anti-corruption a priority.75 These 
changes included 1) increased salaries for workers in key state sectors 
(justice, finance, economy) and key roles related to anti-corruption; 2) 
new jobs in niche sectors; for example, the increased demand for anti-
corruption, anti-trust and anti-money laundering compliance by financial 
institutions has led law firms to make compliance a special and separate 
service, one that has now become integrated into the traditional practice 
areas offered to clients; 3) new hiring policies promoted as part of the 
anti-corruption ethos, which encourage hiring young and inexperienced 
investigators rather than more experienced practitioners (this is based on 
the assumption that young equals non-corrupt; for example, it has become 
73  The implementation gap concerns not only anti-corruption but all policy sectors. 
It has been extensively discussed in public policy studies such as Kevin B. Smith and 
Christopher W. Larimer, ‘How Does It Work? Policy Implementation’, in The Public Policy 
Theory Primer, Philadelphia, PA, 2009, pp. 155–56.
74  For the importance of anti-corruption changes in other contexts, see Roxana Bratu, 
‘The Former Soviet Union’, in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), Controlling Corruption in 
Europe, vol. 1, Oplanden, Berlin and Toronto, 2013, pp. 55–67.
75  Ibid.
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a typical strategy for high-profile prosecutorial bodies such as the DNA in 
Romania to hire young professionals who are aged well under 40);76 4) new 
forms of expertise related to corruption; as new and innovative policies are 
implemented, local actors are exposed to greater interaction with foreign 
experts who are the carriers of new technical languages and practices of 
governance.
 Undoubtedly, a key indicator of the functioning of the new anti-
corruption system relates to how well the criminal justice apparatus 
deals with corruption cases. In all three countries examined here, there 
is clearly an increasing trend toward the conduct of investigations into 
grand corruption. Romania, through its DNA, is the absolute champion 
at investigating and opening grand corruption trials, prosecuting over 
1,000 officials in 2015.77 In Bulgaria, investigations have frequently begun 
but few cases have so far been tried in court and there have been ‘very 
few convictions in cases involving substantial corruption’,78 while in 
Greece the grand corruption investigation patterns have so far not been 
impressive and the results of the new specially dedicated anti-corruption 
institutional setup are yet to be seen. These differences may be explained 
by the dimensions explored in the previous sections and outlined in Tables 
2 and 3 — they point to the fact that making anti-corruption a top policy 
priority coupled with designing an adequate legal framework and a strong 
institutional setup are paramount in increasing the responses of criminal 
justice to corruption. 
 Despite these positive changes, experts have noted the existence of 
an ‘implementation gap’ in all three counties. This refers to the fact 
that there are mismatches between the institutional setting, projected 
functions and actual activities, and between political declarations that 
declare commitment to ‘fight corruption’ yet fail to provide practical 
support for anti-corruption measures. Depending on the context, there 
is a wide array of explanations for this gap ranging from a lack of 
monitoring by the international community to a fragmented approach to 
‘fighting corruption’, fluctuating political commitment, lack of expertise, 
and difficulties in adjusting the new anti-corruption legislation to the 
vernacular legal narratives.
76  Roxana Bratu, ‘Actors, Practices and Networks of Corruption: The Case of Romania’s 
Accession to European Union Funding’, unpublished PhD dissertation, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2014.
77  DNA, Activity Report 2015 <http://www.pna.ro/obiect2.jsp?id=249>. 
78  European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM)’, Brussels, 2015, p. 8 (hereafter, EC 2015a).
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 In Greece, for example, f luctuating government commitment to 
tackling grand corruption and a dearth of suitable means are the main 
reasons for the implementation gap. Between 2000 and 2010, there was 
little political will to focus on grand corruption. The situation changed 
after the financial crisis when successive governments started to adopt 
anti-corruption legislation, announcing their readiness to investigate 
grand corruption in cooperation with foreign authorities. However, this 
shift in government policy was met with reluctance by the judiciary: ‘the 
higher the degree of politicians’ involvement in corruption cases, the 
more difficulties anti-corruption investigations face, because the outcome 
of investigations may bear a political cost’.79 An equally pessimistic 
view is that ‘Greek governments never had a stable commitment to fight 
corruption. Governments have experimented in short time intervals with 
the creation and abolition of an anti-corruption coordinator’s post, new 
ministerial posts and a general secretariat of anti-corruption. This shows 
indecisiveness in fighting corruption’.80
 Making anti-corruption a government priority was not matched by 
the mobilization of resources that would allow the practical achievement 
of policy goals. The judiciary system, if it is to function properly, requires 
financial resources and technical expertise. In the words of an anti-
corruption ‘insider’ in Greece: ‘There are neither skilled anti-corruption 
civil servants nor are there trained judges specializing in anti-corruption. 
Even those judges who have acquired relevant experience are overloaded 
and assigned to try various cases unrelated to corruption’.81 Furthermore:
In many cases under investigation the amount of material gathered is 
unmanageable. The international banking transactions of officials require 
cooperation between the Greek and foreign authorities, which typically 
causes unforeseen delays. In view of these obstacles, the number of skilled 
personnel, such as experienced accountants, at the disposal of the Greek 
prosecuting authorities, is clearly insufficient. Moreover, the higher 
salaries which civil servants in the Ministry of Finance enjoy compared to 
their counterparts in the Ministry of Justice and the Greek courts function 
as a disincentive for personnel transfer to the latter public services, which 
remain understaffed.82
79  Interview with middle-ranking prosecutor, Athens, 30 July 2015.
80  Interview with high-ranking prosecutor, Athens, 20 October 2015.
81  Interview with former high-level government official of the Ministry of Justice, 24 
September 2015.
82  Interview with high-ranking prosecutor, Athens, 20 October 2015.
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 The ‘implementation gap’ is also linked to the fact that formal attempts 
to define corruption in the domestic legislation of each country are rather 
recent. It is thus difficult to accommodate the new legal codifications in 
the local criminal legislation. In all three countries, criminal procedure 
laws still have loopholes which make the investigation, prosecution and 
trying of grand corruption subject to manipulation and delay given that 
the local judiciary systems are overloaded. Furthermore, grand corruption 
cases require high levels of expertise and extensive time to investigate 
highly complex economic arrangements.83 In Bulgaria, investigations into 
cases of grand corruption have frequently begun but few cases have been 
tried in court, resulting in few convictions in cases involving substantial 
corruption.84 It often happens that cases brought to court are insufficiently 
substantiated. Evidence is missing, either involuntarily or on purpose. 
Thus, the hands of judges are tied: ‘When in my capacity as a judge I 
receive incomplete files produced either by prosecutors or the police, how 
can I condemn the accused of corruption?’85
 The ‘implementation gap’ is linked not only to the lack of political will 
to tackle grand corruption, but also to the strong political will to protect 
local entrepreneurs, their fortunes and ways of doing things. An example 
from Greece is the saga with the ‘Lagarde list’, which contained the names 
of 2,062 Greek citizens who held HSBC bank accounts in Geneva. They 
were suspected of tax evasion as their deposits did not correspond to the 
income declared to the Greek tax authorities. Christine Lagarde, who at 
that time was French Finance Minister, passed the list to Greek Finance 
Minister George Papaconstantinou in October 2010 and then to Greek 
prosecutors in December 2012. Papaconstantinou, accused of deleting the 
names of three relatives from the list, was convicted in March 2015 to one 
year in prison suspended for three years. The prosecution of suspects from 
the Lagarde list remains a work in progress; while false impressions have 
been created that all those listed had evaded paying taxes, in practice only 
some are suspected of such unlawful behaviour.
83  Like fraud cases, grand corruption cases involve highly-skilled and usually high-
profile offenders who had the means to access resources not readily available to ordinary 
people. Furthermore, such offenders sometimes had the means to exert influence over the 
top political echelon of each country. In rare cases, they were the top political echelon of a 
country — in for example, in Romania, former prime minister Adrian Nastase and former 
minister Monica Iacob Ridzi were convicted of corruption. Alina Bica, former organized 
crime chief prosecutor, was indicted for corruption in 2015.
84  EC 2015a.
85  Interview with Bulgarian judge, Higher Administrative Court, Sofia, 13 May 2015.
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 The mismatch between anti-corruption intentions and practices may 
also have unintended long-term effects. Local resistance to change, 
compounded by the pressure for reform put on governments by international 
institutions, can pervert the democratic mechanisms of governance. For 
example, the 2003 EC country report for Romania noticed an abuse of 
emergency ordinances, while the 2006 EC country report mentioned 
105 emergency ordinances approved between February and July 2006. 
Often the government has employed a vote of confidence and assumed 
responsibility for passing particular items of legislation; in 2009 the 
government wanted to assume responsibility for the adoption of the new 
Criminal and Civil Codes, invoking the urgency of the matter (eventually, 
the codes were adopted through ordinary procedure in September 2010).86 
Even though these are extraordinary measures, they have been normalized 
by overuse. This situation not only creates a perpetual sense of urgency but 
may, at a more subtle level, subvert the democratic process because these 
are all mechanisms to bypass parliamentary debates.
 To sum up, this section has shown that the three countries are at different 
stages in the process of implementing anti-corruption reforms. Romania 
has not only designed a strong anti-corruption institutional framework 
(Table 3), but also made it fully functional. Far from perfect, anti-corruption 
reforms have taken centre stage in this country. By comparison, Bulgaria 
has made little use of its specially designed institutional establishment, 
while Greece has only recently begun to implement an anti-corruption 
framework.
Politicization of anti-corruption in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania 
This section turns to the last row of Table 1. It argues that, in the three 
countries covered by this research, anti-corruption has become a semantic 
of governance. As a political exercise, anti-corruption takes different forms, 
bears various meanings and may have unintended effects ranging from 
disenchantment with anti-corruption measures as useful tools to counter 
grand corruption to delegitimization of anti-corruption practices. ‘Politics 
often demands the manufacturing of useful clichés’87 so, when political 
elites refer to successful anti-corruption initiatives such as punishment 
of key corrupt figures, they are seeking to boost their own prestige. 
Similarly, when political elites employ corruption narratives in their 
86  Transparency International, Raportul Naţional asupra Corupţiei Octombrie 2009 – 
Februarie 2011, Bucharest, 2011.
87  Ivan Krastev, ‘The Anti-American Century?’, Journal of Democracy, 15, 2004, 2, p. 10.
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political campaigns to smear their opponents, they are enhancing their 
own symbolic capital by positioning themselves in antithesis to corrupt 
individuals. The discursive power of corruption is a recent anthropological 
theme,88 which refers to practices that portray political action through 
corruption talk (allegations or facts). Building on high levels of perceived 
corruption and media reports, this typical practice becomes a common 
way to make sense of politics. As a result, political competition is ‘reduced 
to a confrontation between a government accused of corruption and an 
opposition that claims to be slightly less corrupt’.89 The discursive power 
of corruption refers to practices that frame political action through 
development and anti-corruption, with the effect of enhancing users’ 
symbolic capital.
 In Bulgaria, anti-corruption could always be detected in political party 
rhetoric, but was rarely followed up on by concrete actions of government 
officials and the judiciary. The leading political party — GERB — first 
came to power in 2009 when it won the parliamentary elections on an 
electoral agenda that focused heavily on the fight against corruption. This 
was in line with the views of the EC, which had suspended EU structural 
funding to Bulgaria in the second semester of 2008. However, the issue 
disappeared from the political agenda until 2013 when popular protests 
against the nomination of media mogul Delyan Peevski to head the State 
Agency for National Security returned corruption to the public agenda 
and made it a major theme in the 2014 electoral campaign. Even so, party 
representatives refrained from accusing their counterparts of corruption, 
leaving several doors open for potential post-election alliances.90
 In Romania, anti-corruption became a political tool mostly after 2004. 
The elections that year were won by a liberal-democratic coalition and 
the new government declared that fighting corruption would be its main 
priority. Macovei was appointed as Minister of Justice and spearheaded 
an anti-corruption movement. While, as noted above, her efforts were 
applauded by Brussels, Romanian officials were less appreciative of 
Macovei’s efforts and the Senate supported a motion against her which 
led to her dismissal. Her successor, Tudor Chiuariu, spent less than a 
year in office and was dismissed by President Băsescu when charged in a 
corruption case. Later, former prime minister Adrian Nastase was accused 
88  Haller and Shore, Corruption; Torsello, The New Environmentalism.
89  Krastev, ‘Anti-American Century’, p. 10.
90  For example, the coalition government formed in November 2014, under Prime 
Minister Boyko Borisov, had three coalition members (GERB, Reformist Block and 
Alternative for Bulgarian Revival) and also enjoyed parliamentary support from the 
Patriotic Front.
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and indicted for corruption and in 2015 Victor Ponta resigned as prime 
minister amid public discontent that was not unrelated to corruption 
accusations.
 In the context of Greece’s polarized party system, consisting of 
repeated electoral contests between the New Democracy and Pasok parties, 
accusations of corruption served only the needs of political competition 
between the two parties. The politicization of anti-corruption dates to 1989 
when opposition parties constructed their parliamentary election campaign 
by accusing incumbent socialist ministers of corruption. Ever since, parties 
who won elections threatened to launch criminal investigations against the 
previous holders of power. Such moves typically hit a dead end due to lack 
of evidence. For over two decades, no politician was tried for corruption 
until, in 2015, former Finance Minister Papaconstantinou was convicted. 
With Greece’s economic crisis, accusations of corruption became part 
of the common narrative used by both left and right. Syriza made use 
of corruption rhetoric to explain the collapse of state finance. After 
winning the 2015 January elections, the new Syriza-ANEL coalition further 
politicized anti-corruption. The newly created Anti-Corruption Ministry 
divided observers: some saw it as a welcome initiative that showed the 
government’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts. Others were more 
cautious, arguing that since ‘the recent anti-corruption reforms passed in 
2015 there is a tendency of establishing political control over the judiciary 
and independent authorities, which is indicative of the government’s aim 
to use the fight against corruption as a tool of political communication’.91
 Anti-corruption may indeed be a performance act used to keep up 
appearances before the international community and domestic population, 
while in reality serving as a tool to ‘look after our own’ and provide 
shelter from prosecution for people from the same social group/business 
circles/political party. When this is the case, ‘fighting corruption’ is more 
a rhetorical device or fashionable trend than an authentic political act. 
Furthermore, anti-corruption is sometimes used as a negative tool when 
the justice system is politically influenced by powerful groups keen to 
discredit their opponents in the lead-up to elections, thereby reducing 
their electoral chances. In such cases, anti-corruption can end promising 
political careers. In Romania, for example, former president Traian 
Băsescu claimed that the attempt to replace him in 2012 was a response 
to his reformist policies aimed at ending corruption.92 Last but not least, 
91  Interview with middle-ranking prosecutor, Athens, 27 July 2015.
92  <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21605953-traian-basescu-ending-his-
presidency-amid-corruption-scandal-oh-brother>.
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the impartiality of the justice system is questioned in some cases, as anti-
corruption gives an extraordinary mandate to a specific professional 
category such as prosecution. In Romania, there have been allegations that 
the DNA is the representative of an abusive justice system that fabricates 
charges resembling science fiction, making use of ‘KGB methods’ (a 
reference to the secret police of the Soviet Union) to create a ‘witch hunt’.93
 The politicization of anti-corruption is sustained by its spectacularization 
conducted through mass media. Corruption cases are publicized since 
they fascinate the public and increase readership/followers. The media 
market is highly sensitive to such changes so, if a corruption allegation 
related to a high-profile individual (usually a politician) is considered 
at least minimally plausible it is likely, regardless of the evidence, to 
be highlighted by the local press. It is accordingly not uncommon that 
‘corruption allegations are born in the media and also die in the media’.94 
‘Ideally the publicity around political corruption could have a pedagogical 
aspect, that is, it could function as a disincentive for politicians prone 
to engage in corrupt practices while discharging their duties.’95 More 
often, however, the media make a spectacle out of criminal investigations, 
sometimes with the full support of public institutions who hope thereby 
indirectly to gain legitimacy and public support. It has for example been 
alleged that the Romanian DNA calls the press when making arrests and 
subsequently leaks details from the prosecution file to carefully chosen 
media channels.96 In Bulgaria, the anti-corruption spectacle has led on the 
one hand to increased popular sensitivity to corruption and, on the other, 
to the normalization of expectations: 
The public may have settled for something less than acceptable transparency 
and accountability of high-ranking officials: corruption has deep roots in 
society, from the lowest to the highest levels, and is often seen as justifiable, 
needed or normal in the specific socio-cultural context.97 
The futility of anti-corruption is sustained by other delegitimization 




94   Interview with expert on corruption, Sofia, 08 October 2010.
95  Interview with former government official of Ministry of Interior, Athens, 24 
September 2015.
96  <www.luju.ro>.
97  Interview with political analyst, Sofia, 15 March 2015.
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against corruption, dreamers, or, in Romania, ‘anti-corruption knights’. 
By using such terms, the media indirectly cast doubt on the institutions 
and actors involved in anti-corruption, who should be ethical role-models.
 This section has analysed the politicization of anti-corruption. It has 
found that, in all three countries, both corruption and anti-corruption 
have to varying degrees become part of the semantics of governance. 
Table 4 presents Romania as a context that accommodates the frequent 
use of corruption narratives with the aim of increasing symbolic capital in 
everyday political encounters. Simultaneously, anti-corruption institutions, 
even when strong, are not left unscrutinized by non-state actors. Bulgaria 
displays high levels of politicization of corruption at the level of political 
rhetoric, but less focus on the anti-corruption institutional framework, 
while Greece is only just starting to catch up.
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Conclusion and theoretical implications
Transnational organizations and governments from various countries have 
invested heavily in anti-corruption policies and practices with varying 
degrees of success. In an attempt to explain the variation, we contend that 
anti-corruption should not be regarded as a technical solution to a technical 
problem related to the lack of a modernized, watertight legal framework 
and insufficient resources (funds, personnel and expertise) necessary 
to tackle corruption. Neither should unsuccessful anti-corruption be 
interpreted as the result of a prevailing culture of ‘particularism’.98 
98  Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Deconstructing Balkan Particularism: The Ambiguous 
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Without completely rejecting the aforementioned ‘political-cultural’ and 
‘technical-organizational’ approaches, we have employed a third way 
that is based on social constructionism. In this view, anti-corruption 
becomes a contemporary cultural and political form through which 
modernization is strategized, control is made manifest and history is 
dispersed as old institutions fade so that new institutional layers can be 
added. Furthermore, anti-corruption is a process, contextually shaped 
by international and domestic factors that relate to political priorities, 
organizational development, political party competition and a mass media 
market that dramatizes corruption. Attempts by political figures to gain 
and hold power are often legitimized through positive association with 
an anti-corruption agenda. Conversely, the need to discredit political 
opponents is negatively associated with corruption scandals.
 In comparing our case-studies, we took account of four key elements 
(see Table 1): the historical evolution of corruption understanding and anti-
corruption as a policy priority; the development of the anti-corruption 
establishment; the implementation of anti-corruption policies; and the 
politicization of the process. We found that each of our case-studies is at 
a different stage in the anti-corruption process — see Table 5 for details. 
We consider Greece as an ideal-type of unreflective accommodation with 
the standard anti-corruption toolkit, a passive receiver of knowledge from 
international expertise. Despite the fact that anti-corruption has recently 
been identified by the government as a policy priority, the institutional 
setting, legal codification and resources assigned to anti-corruption do not 
show high levels of implementation. This does not however impede the 
politicization of anti-corruption or its use as a tool in electoral campaigns.
 Our second case — Bulgaria — is reactive legitimation. In this 
situation, corruption is a well acknowledged issue and anti-corruption a 
policy-priority for the government at a discursive level. Anti-corruption 
institutions do exist, but there is a distinctive implementation gap, as 
institutions do not function according to their design — for example, there 
are few corruption investigations, prosecutions and convictions. The levels 
of scandalization are high, due to the fact that corruption is a matter of 
serious public concern.
Social Capital of Southeastern Europe’, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, 5, 2005, 1, pp. 45–65; Stoyanov et al., ‘Bulgarian Anti-Corruption Reforms’.
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 Lastly, Romania represents another ideal type: proactive assimilation. 
In this instance, anti-corruption is a top policy priority. This is reflected 
not only in government declarations but also in the amount of resources 
assigned to the anti-corruption establishment and its evolution. While 
far from perfect, Romania’s anti-corruption prosecution has become one 
of the top criminal justice institutions in the EU. And, even if the match 
between the size of the problem and the institutional solutions in place 
is imperfect, there are clear and observable steps towards what could be 
defined as successful anti-corruption. Such high levels of implementation 
are matched only by an even higher degree of politicization. On the darker 
side, accusations of corruption are part and parcel of everyday rhetoric. 
Anti-corruption institutions themselves are heavily scrutinized and are 
not infrequently accused of political involvement.
 The theoretical implication of this social constructionist approach 
is that we problematize the feelings of inevitability that surround anti-
corruption institutions and practices. The empirical implication is that 
we investigate anti-corruption episodes as processes that, far from being 
inherent to transitions, have been instrumental to the legitimation of 
new regimes and whose creation is the result of social and political 
manipulation. Without disregarding its moral or social benefits, we 
argue that anti-corruption has more often than not become a site for the 
negotiation of political agendas whose results have benefited the initiators 
and local elites. Unlike more traditional approaches, this article does not 
assume that anti-corruption is ‘good’ or ‘apolitical’ to societies because 
of its alleged merits. Quite the contrary, this article aims to increase our 
understanding of how anti-corruption efforts are constructed and shaped 
by their historical and institutional contexts, social actions and political 
bargains.
